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The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues 
Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System 
We are at the beginning of a mighty struggle for control of the 
Internet—the web links everything and very soon it will mediate 
most human activity—because the Internet has fashioned a new and 
complicated environment for an age-old dilemma that pits the 
demands of security with the desire for freedom.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology experts have described Bitcoin as a “masterpiece of 
technology”—a work of genius on par with the Mona Lisa.2 Its 
beauty, though, is not outwardly apparent but instead lies at the heart 
of its design. Bitcoin is a digital currency system created to facilitate 
Internet commerce. It does this by using digital signatures and peer-
to-peer technology to curtail the system’s need for trusted third 
parties, such as financial intermediaries and central banks.3 Bitcoin’s 
architecture gives it several advantages over alternative payment 
systems: transaction costs are lower, privacy is enhanced, and 
inflationary pressures within the system should be reduced.4  
“Currency . . . is exactly like religion. It’s based entirely on 
faith.”5 This is especially the case with Bitcoin; no government, 
corporation, or commodity (like gold) backs the digital currency.6 
Practically, however, it is not very different from established fiat 
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 1. Presentation, Misha Glenny, Hire the Hackers!, TED (Sept. 2011), 
available at http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/ted-global-misha-glenny-says-hire-
hackers-091511.  
 2. Ari Altstedter, Bitcoins Create Truly Democratic Policy, Followers Say, 
CANADA.COM (Jul. 22, 2011) (on file with author) (quoting IT consultant, Bruce 
Wagner) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
BITCOIN.ORG, 1–2, 4 (2008), http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. See discussion infra 
Part I.B.1–2. 
 4. Id. at 1, 6; Andy Greenberg, Crypto Currency, FORBES (May 9, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0509/technology-psilocybin-bitcoins-gavin-
andresen-crypto-currency.html. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 5. Matthew Yeomans, The Quest for a Global E-Currency, CNN (Sept. 28, 
1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-09-28/tech/9909_28_global.e.currency.idg_1 
_credit-card-debit-global-internet-project/3 (quoting Jack Weatherford, author of 
THE HISTORY OF MONEY).  
 6. Video, Bitcoin & the End of State-Controlled Money: Q&A with Jerry 
Brito, REASON.COM, http://reason.tv/video/show/jerry-brito-on-bitcoin (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2011). 
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currencies.7 Bitcoin’s value fluctuates with respect to the value of 
other currencies, and Bitcoins can be spent anywhere a merchant is 
willing to accept them.8  
In 2008, an enigmatic programmer, known only as Satoshi 
Nakamoto, first proposed the idea for Bitcoin on a cryptography 
email list.9 Early the following year, he published the open-source 
software that implemented his system online.10 Since then, a 
growing community of developers has maintained the software, 
which has been downloaded hundreds of thousands of times by 
individuals all over the world.11 At one point, Bitcoin attained a 
circulation worth approximately $100 million.12 
Bitcoin’s positive attributes should make it attractive to 
consumers and merchants.13 If it attains a critical mass with both 
groups, it could one day become a mainstream currency.14 In fact, as 
a result of the increased access our society has to networked 
technology, some have intimated that the use of private, digital 
                                                                                                             
 7. “Fiat money . . . [is] not redeemable for any commodity; its status as 
money is conferred initially by the government but eventually by common 
experience.” WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY 
INTRODUCTION 732 (6th ed. 2003). 
 8. Paul Krugman, Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:20 
AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/golden-cyberfetters; Bitcoin 
Has Got Geeks Excited. What About Economists?, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 18, 
2011, at 83, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18836780. This aspect 
of Bitcoin gives it an advantage over digital, community currencies that can only 
be used within the community that created them, such as Second Life’s Linden 
Dollars, Facebook Credits, and World of Warcraft Gold. Reuben Grinberg, 
Bitcoin: An Innovative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 171–
72 (2012). See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 9. It is likely that the programmer’s name is actually a pseudonym. Tom 
Simonite, What Bitcoin Is, and Why It Matters, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (May 
25, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/37619. The idea at the 
core of the Bitcoin system actually comes from “a concept called crypto-currency, 
which was first described in 1998 by Wei Dai.” About Bitcoin, BITCOIN.ORG, 
http://bitcoin.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 10. Simonite, supra note 9. 
 11. About Bitcoin, supra note 9 (listing developers that have contributed to 
the Bitcoin software); Download Statistics: Bitcoin, SOURCEFORGE, http: 
//sourceforge.net/projects/bitcoin/files/Bitcoin/stats/timeline?dates=2010-09-22 
+to+2011-09-22 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).  
 12. Thomas Lowenthal, Bitcoin: Inside the Encrypted, Peer-to-Peer Digital 
Currency, ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/bit 
coin-inside-the-encrypted-peer-to-peer-currency.ars (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
As of April 10, 2013, “the value of all outstanding Bitcoins is a bit less than $3 
billion.” Timothy B. Lee, Nobody Knows If There’s a Bitcoin Bubble, FORBES 
(Apr. 10, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04 
/10/nobody-knows-if-bitcoin-is-a-bubble.  
 13. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 160. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 14. Altstedter, supra note 2. 
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currencies may prove to be the norm in the future. Even their limited 
success could have a substantial impact on the fate of more 
traditional currencies.15 
The Bitcoin system itself is still in the early stages of 
development.16 Its massive growth in a relatively short timeframe 
may predominantly be credited to the excitement it has given geeks 
and libertarians.17 The partial anonymity provided by the system, 
however, has led to a concern that the currency will be increasingly 
used for criminal purposes.18 Additionally, Bitcoin’s lack of 
government oversight also gives way to another troublesome aspect 
of the system: a lack of consumer safeguards.19 As one might 
conclude, where large sums of money flow, legal consequences are 
sure to follow.20  
While Bitcoin is certainly not the first digital currency to gain 
traction online,21 its innovative architecture is sure to make direct 
regulation impractical.22 Even though Bitcoin raises a number of 
concerns that its community cannot fully address, a complete 
prohibition on its use would be a rash and ineffective response.23 
Ultimately, regulatory efforts directed at Bitcoin exchanges would 
best serve the interests of lawmakers.24 However, due to the 
international nature of both the system and its actors, such controls 
may only be successful at the domestic level.25 
                                                                                                             
 15. Jennifer L. Schenker, The Future of Money, INFORMILO (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.informilo.com/20120123/future-money-488; Simonite, supra note 9. 
 16. Scott Thill, Bitcoin: A New Kind of Money That’s Beyond the Reach of 
Bankers, Wall St., and Regulators?, GUERNICA (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www 
.guernicamag.com/blog/2941/scott_thill_bitcoin_a_new_kind. 
 17. Schenker, supra note 15. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 18. Cindy Cohn, EFF and Bitcoin, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jun. 
20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/06/eff-and-bitcoin. See discussion 
infra Part III.A. 
 19. Id. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 20. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004). 
 21. WebMoney, E-Gold, Pecunix, and Liberty Reserve are digital currencies 
that are based on, or backed by, the price of gold. Peter C. Tucker, The Digital 
Currency Doppelganger: Regulatory Challenge or Harbinger of the New 
Economy?, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 598 (2009). Flooz and Beenz 
were corporate-backed digital currencies that failed during the “dot-com bust” due 
to lack of consumer interest. Mark W. Vigoroso, Beenz.com Closes Internet 
Currency Business, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Aug. 17, 2001, 6:39 PM), http://www 
.ecommercetimes.com/story/12892.html.  
 22. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.A, C. 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 25. Id. 
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Part I of this Comment looks at the specific shortcomings of the 
current financial system, which prompted Bitcoin’s development. It 
then explains how Bitcoin’s architecture enables it to overcome 
these shortcomings. Part II reviews the legal barriers that private 
currencies face and analyze how they might apply to Bitcoin. Part 
III provides an overview of the Bitcoin economy by examining its 
participants and discussing the hurdles it must overcome if it is ever 
to become a mainstream currency. Part IV evaluates the motivations 
behind, and the merits of, three regulatory regimes, and also 
considers the Bitcoin community’s likely response.26 
I. THE FUTURE OF COMMERCE? 
A. The Costs of Trust 
Between his self-published whitepaper and forum posts 
describing the Bitcoin system’s technical underpinnings, Nakamoto 
made his motivations for creating the currency clear: the removal of 
trusted third parties.27 While third parties, like central banks and 
financial intermediaries, often perform valuable services in 
regulating and transferring currency, their presence in the system 
increases the cost of using it.28  
 Central banks are government institutions that, among other 
things, are responsible for their nations’ money supply.29 In effect, 
                                                                                                             
 26. While this Comment’s primary focus is the Bitcoin system, its 
applicability is not so limited in scope. Taking into account the daily volatility of 
the Bitcoin economy, in addition to the recent security vulnerabilities that have 
troubled major market participants, the currency could go belly-up at any moment. 
Such a development, however, is of little concern to this Comment’s analysis; the 
regulatory issues discussed herein are just as important to Bitcoin’s progeny as 
they are to the Bitcoin system itself. Its two-and-a-half-year history has at least 
demonstrated that decentralized currencies are technologically feasible and likely 
here to stay. Noam Cohen, Speed Bumps on the Road to Virtual Cash, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/business/media/04link.html; 
Daniel Lyons, The Web’s Secret Cash, THE DAILY BEAST (Jun. 19, 2011), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/19/the-web-s-secret-cash.html. 
 27. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1; Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source 
Implementation of P2P Currency, P2P FOUNDATION (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:27 PM), 
http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/bitcoin-open-source.  
 28. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1, 4. In this context, cost is used in a broad 
sense not only to include the increased financial expense of the system, but also 
the inconvenience and uncertainty that it entails. Additionally, many of the 
motivations behind Bitcoin’s creation were also at work in bringing about the 
development of its digital currency predecessors. 
 29. That is, the quantity of money that circulates in the economy. FREDERIC S. 
MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 248, 
G-7 (8th ed. 2007). 
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the populace places a significant amount of trust in these institutions 
to make sound policy decisions that are detached from political 
influence and provide for stable economic growth.30 Their track 
records, however, are not perfect. 
 Central banks’ decisions to engage in overly expansionary 
monetary policy run the risk of creating high levels of inflation, 
thereby decreasing the nations’ spending power.31 While the United 
States’ own central bank, the Federal Reserve (the Fed), may take this 
action to redistribute wealth, reduce unemployment, or finance 
deficits, “virtually no limit exists with respect to what [it] can do with 
the nation’s money supply.”32 In fact, history is replete with examples 
of monetary policy spiraling out of control, often at the will of 
governments that would rather finance their expenditures by printing 
money, instead of, for instance, raising taxes.33 Furthermore, central 
banks often rely on economic indicators and principles to guide their 
policy decisions; a misinterpretation of—or rigid reliance upon—
either of the two can have particularly disastrous consequences.34 
 In addition to central banks, the market relies on financial 
intermediaries, such as banks, credit card companies, and electronic 
payment processors, to serve as trusted third parties between the 
participants in an online transaction.35 The cost of using these 
                                                                                                             
 30. Michael D. Bordo, A Brief History of Central Banks, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF CLEVELAND (Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary 
/2007/12.cfm.  
 31. MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 393; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S 
GREAT DEPRESSION 7 (5th ed. 2000), available at http://mises.org/rothbard 
/agd.pdf.  
 32. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal & Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65–66 (1996). Some scholars have argued that the Federal 
Reserve’s misuse of monetary policy has contributed to the current financial crisis. 
John B. Taylor, The Fed and the Crisis: A Reply to Ben Bernanke, WALL STREET 
J. (Jan. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034810045 
74646100272016422.html. 
 33. Germany experienced massive hyperinflation in the years following 
World War I, the rate of which ultimately exceeded one million percent and led to 
the collapse of its currency. Though not nearly as severe, the Latin American 
countries of Peru, Brazil, and Argentina each underwent a period of rapid inflation 
between 1980 and 1990. More recently, Zimbabwe’s own problems with 
hyperinflation necessitated the production of banknotes with face values of $100 
trillion. Their currency, too, was eventually abandoned. MISHKIN, supra note 29, 
at 614–15; Chris Bowlby, The Fear of Printing Too Much Money, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 5, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7925981.stm. 
 34. MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 408; Bordo, supra note 30. Bordo argues that 
the Federal Reserve’s own strict adherence to the real bills doctrine in the 1920s 
led to the stock market crash of 1929, and eventually—after the Federal Reserve 
failed to act as a lender of last resort—to the onset of the Great Depression. Bordo, 
supra note 30. 
 35. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 3. 
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intermediaries comes in the form of transaction fees, which must be 
borne by the buyer, the seller, or both parties, depending on the 
particular intermediary and the nature of the exchange.36 Not only 
do the presence of these fees reduce the seller’s profit margin, but 
they also limit the minimum practical size of the transaction to a few 
dollars, cutting off the possibility of smaller value transactions such 
as micropayments.37 
Minimizing the risks associated with these transactions is a 
primary purpose of third party intermediaries.38 The most pressing 
of these risks is the threat of fraud, such as when buyers attempt to 
reverse the charges to their account after receiving a good or 
service.39 (The process of payment reversal, fraudulent or otherwise, 
is known as a charge-back).40 When these allegations arise, 
intermediaries are unable to avoid mediating the ensuing dispute, an 
                                                                                                             
 36. David D. Friedman & Kerry L. Macintosh, The Cash of the Twenty-First 
Century, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 273, 277 (2001). 
Merchants typically must pay between 2% and 6% of the total purchase price to 
both the merchant bank and credit card company. Tucker, supra note 21, at 604. 
The popular online payment website, PayPal, charges sellers a 1.9% to 2.9% + 
$0.30 fee. For personal transfers funded by credit or debit cards, a 2.9% + $0.30 
fee is assessed, with the sender having the option of which party will cover the 
cost. Fees, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_display-fees-
outside (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
 37. Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 36, at 277; Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 
1; MARGARET JANE RADIN ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 1194 n.9 (2nd ed. 2006); Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source 
Implementation of P2P Currency, supra note 27. A micropayment is 
a financial payment in an amount that is small relative to the 
transaction costs that would be incurred in making the payment 
using traditional payment mechanisms. . . . 
In the late 1990s micropayments were heralded as a breakthrough 
payment technology for Internet commerce, one that would make 
possible a broad array of new business models. Micropayments 
seemed to be the ideal way to sell low-value digital products for 
small amounts of money, amounting to a large revenue stream in 
the aggregate. But micropayments never caught on. 
RADIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 1194 (footnote omitted). While their past failure 
may be attributed to their impracticality, other theories exist as to why they were 
unsuccessful. Id. at 1177. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, The Case Against Micropayments, 
P2P FOUNDATION (Dec. 19, 2000), http://openp2p.com/lpt/a//p2p/2000/12/19 
/micropayments.html (arguing that micropayments failed “because they are a bad 
idea”). 
 38. Kenneth N. Kuttner & James J. McAndrews, Personal On-Line 
Payments, 7 ECON. POL’Y REV. 35, 41 (2001). 
 39. Id.; Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 36, at 277. These payment 
reversals are both costly and inconvenient for merchants, and also unavoidable 
when conducted using any medium other than physical currency. Nakamoto, 
supra note 3, at 1. 
 40. Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 38. 
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act that increases their overhead, the fees they impose on their 
customers, and, thus, the transaction costs of the entire system.41 
Because certain types of businesses tend to create higher rates of 
charge-backs than others, some intermediaries may even prevent 
their customers from patronizing them altogether, thus diminishing 
freedom in the market.42 Finally, these intermediaries often retain a 
large quantity of the parties’ personal data to decrease the number of 
times it is transmitted over the Internet.43 Thus, they must also be 
trusted to store this information safely, keeping the parties’ purchase 
histories private and their sensitive account information secure from 
the dangers of identity theft.44  
In the Section that follows, the underlying architecture of the 
Bitcoin system is explored, in addition to the ways that this 
architecture attempts to do away with many of the costs imposed by 
this “trust-based model.” 
B. Replacing Trust with Cryptography 
 1. System Architecture 
The Bitcoin system is comprised of a decentralized peer-to-peer 
network of connected computers, also known as nodes, each running 
a version of the Bitcoin client software.45 In addition to providing 
other functions, the client serves as the user’s digital wallet, which 
holds his supply of Bitcoins.46  
When the client is initially run, the application generates a set of 
cryptographic keys that are mathematically related to one another.47 
One key is private and remains concealed on the user’s computer.48 
                                                                                                             
 41. Tucker, supra note 21, at 605.  
 42. The best examples of these businesses are those that provide online access 
to either adult content or gambling; individuals who purchase adult content, or 
lose money through online gambling websites, often dispute the charges with their 
credit card company. In some cases, financial intermediaries prevent their 
customers from patronizing these businesses because they are illegal in the 
customer’s jurisdiction. RADIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 21–22. 
 43. Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 38, at 41. 
 44. Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Currency, supra 
note 27. 
 45. Simonite, supra note 9; Lowenthal, supra note 12. The latest version of 
the Bitcoin client can be found at http://bitcoin.org. 
 46. J.P., Virtual Currency, THE ECONOMIST (Jun. 13, 2011, 8:30 PM) 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency. 
 47. These keys are stored as a part of the user’s wallet file and “can be 
transferred to another computer, for example, if [the user] upgrades.” Simonite, 
supra note 9. 
 48. Id. 
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The other key, often referred to as a Bitcoin address, is made public; 
it is used to accept Bitcoin payments from other users.49 Together, 
these keys serve as the user’s digital signature.50 
The client is also responsible for downloading a log of all 
transactions that have ever taken place on the network.51 Because 
Bitcoin transactions are organized into successive groups, called 
blocks, this log is aptly named the blockchain.52 The blockchain 
records the path of every Bitcoin as it changes hands through the 
network, thereby functioning as the definitive public ledger of every 
user’s account balance.53 
The mechanics of the Bitcoin system are best understood 
through the context of a transaction as it propagates through the 
network. When a sender initiates a transfer of Bitcoins, the amount 
of the transaction is encoded with the recipient’s public key.54 “By 
exploiting the mathematical relationship between his public and 
private keys,” the recipient is able to prove his identity and accept 
the transfer.55 The sender, meanwhile, acknowledges the transfer of 
these coins by signing the same transaction with his private key, 
thereby informing the network that the Bitcoins formerly located in 
his account now have a new owner.56 The results of the exchange 
are then broadcast to all of the nodes connected to the Bitcoin 
network.57  
However, for the network to approve the transaction, and add it 
to the newest block at the end of the chain, it must undergo a 
complex verification process that utilizes hashing and forced work.58 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. Bitcoin addresses generally look something like this: 
1LhksUu1AcqoUdehhhY99oRDPNynCszymB. 
 50. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 2. 
 51. If the user’s client is not connected to the Bitcoin network for an extended 
period of time, upon rejoining, it will download the newest blocks that were added 
while it was offline. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1. 
 52. J.P., supra note 46; Thill, supra note 16; Altstedter, supra note 2. 
 53. Danny O’Brien, Imagine Your Computer As a Wallet Full of Bitcoins, 
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance 
/2010/1126/1224284180416.html (on file with author). The blockchain can be 
viewed online at http://blockexplorer.com. 
 54. J.P., supra note 46; Simonite, supra note 9. 
 55. J.P., supra note 46; Simonite, supra note 9. A critical aspect of this 
process is that “it is practically impossible—even with the most powerful 
supercomputer—to work out someone’s private key from their public key.” This 
ensures that an attacker may not fraudulently accept Bitcoins by masquerading as 
the intended recipient. Simonite, supra note 9. 
 56. Simonite, supra note 9; Lowenthal, supra note 12. 
 57. Altstedter, supra note 2. 
 58. Simonite, supra note 9. J.P. provides a simple explanation of hashing:  
A hashing algorithm converts a message into a number called a hash value 
. . . . If this number is big enough, it provides a unique representation of the 
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Using a hash value of the new and previously valid transactions, 
nodes race to determine the solution to a cryptographic puzzle that 
can only be found through extensive trial and error.59 Once the 
solution is discovered, it is forwarded to the other nodes so that its 
accuracy can be verified.60 If they are satisfied with the result, the 
new transactions are approved, and each node adds the block 
containing them to the end of their chain.61 The process then begins 
again to confirm all Bitcoin transactions that have occurred in the 
interim while the nodes were solving the previous block.62 
To incentivize users to participate in the computationally 
intensive task of verifying the network’s transactions, the first node 
to discover the solution to each block is rewarded with 50 
Bitcoins.63 However, this amount is halved for every 210,000 blocks 
that are found, up to a total issuance of approximately 21 million 
                                                                                                             
 
original . . . . [I]t is impossible to reconstruct the original on the basis of the 
[hash value] alone . . . [n]or is it possible to predict what the [hash value] 
would be for even a slightly tweaked version of the original message . . . . 
As a result, hashing is . . . an irreversible process. 
J.P., supra note 46. 
 59. J.P., supra note 46; Altstedter, supra note 2. Because many solutions to 
the puzzle exist, the chance of finding one is dependent upon the number of nodes 
searching and the amount of computing power they dedicate to the process. To 
ensure that solutions are found at a steady rate as these inputs change, a variable is 
correspondingly adjusted that makes it either easier or more difficult to find a 
solution. Lowenthal, supra note 12. By making the task of solution discovery 
“prohibitively costly to . . . individual [nodes], but relatively cheap for the network 
as a whole,” users are effectively prevented from attempting to include forged 
transactions into the blockchain. J.P., supra note 46. 
 60. Simonite, supra note 9. 
 61. Altstedter, supra note 2. As Nakamoto explains: 
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will 
keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions 
of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the 
other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save 
the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when 
the next [block] is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that 
were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one. 
Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 3. 
 62. Lowenthal, supra note 12. 
 63. The winning nodes are not only rewarded with newly minted Bitcoins. 
Users are encouraged to include with their payments a minimal, self-imposed 
transaction fee, which operates to prioritize it in the verification process. When the 
block is solved, the winning node also receives the sum of all transaction fees 
included with it. In this way, as the rate of coins that are minted decreases, the 
system is still able to provide participation incentives. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 
4; Simonite, supra note 9. 
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Bitcoins.64 This process is known as mining, because it is meant to 
imitate the act of prospecting for precious minerals.65 
 
 2. Design Implications  
 
Even in the abstract, the Bitcoin system is quite complex, but 
necessarily so. Its architecture provides it with a number of 
advantages over the trust-based model previously discussed, the first 
of which is its novel approach to counterfeit prevention.66 
All currencies must address the problem of counterfeiting; in the 
context of digital currencies, it is known as the double-spending 
problem.67 Because these coins are essentially nothing more than 
bits of data, the same coin may be copied and used multiple times.68 
While this is not a problem for other types of computer files, the 
ability to arbitrarily create and spend the same coin erodes one of 
the facets that makes money valuable: scarcity.69 
Instead of introducing into the system a trusted intermediary to 
guarantee that the parties do not attempt to double-spend their coins, 
Bitcoin solves this problem through the use of its blockchain.70 
Because all transactions are broadcast to each node in the network 
and eventually find their way into this public ledger, each node has 
incontestable proof of the ownership and transactional history of 
each Bitcoin.71 The sheer computational force required to alter the 
blockchain ensures that transactions cannot be undone and that the 
same coin cannot be spent twice.72  
                                                                                                             
 64. Vitalik Buterin, Block Reward Halving: A Guide, BITCOIN MAGAZINE 
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/block-reward-halving-a-guide. At the 
current rate of block discovery, this will occur roughly once every four years. J.P., 
supra note 46. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 65. J.P., supra note 46. “The steady addition of a constant . . . amount of new 
coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. 
In [the case of Bitcoin], it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.” 
Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4.  
 66. Thill, supra note 16. 
 67. BARBARA A. GOOD, PRIVATE MONEY: EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN, 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (1998), available at http://www.clevelandfed 
.org/research/commentary/1998/0401.pdf; Lowenthal, supra note 12. 
 68. Lowenthal, supra note 12. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Because the verification of each block requires the hash of the previously 
valid blocks, an attacker would be forced to redo the work of each of the blocks 
after the one that involved the transaction he sought to reverse or change. Thus, he 
would have to eventually outpace the work of all other “honest” nodes on the 
network to ensure that his doctored blockchain would become the accepted 
standard. After each new “honest” block is added to the chain after the attack 
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Bitcoin also manages to provide a certain degree of privacy to its 
users.73 Despite each node’s access to the blockchain, transactions 
are kept partially anonymous because only the users’ Bitcoin 
addresses (that is, their public keys) are published within it.74 As no 
personally identifying information is tied to this address, viewers are 
only able to discern that one party sent a certain amount of Bitcoins 
to another.75 Functionally, this is similar to the way information is 
released at stock exchanges: trade sizes and times are published 
without revealing the identity of the party buying or selling.76 
Nevertheless, the public nature of the blockchain means that 
transactional anonymity is not foolproof, especially if users fail to 
take additional precautions to maintain their privacy.77 
                                                                                                             
 
begins, it becomes exponentially more improbable that he could accomplish this 
goal. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4. Nevertheless, if the attacker were able to 
amass a majority of the computing power on the network, his goal would become 
feasible. The chance of this occurring is unlikely because “[t]he combined power 
of the network is currently equal to one of the most powerful supercomputers in 
the world,” and would thus prove to be exceptionally expensive. Simonite, supra 
note 9 (quoting one of Bitcoin’s core developers, Jeff Garzik); J.P., supra note 46. 
Regardless, a successful attack would not subject the Bitcoin system to “arbitrary 
changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged 
to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, 
and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them.” Nakamoto, supra 
note 3, at 6. Furthermore, the fact that nodes are rewarded with Bitcoins for 
verifying new blocks provides an incentive for the attacker to stay honest. As 
Nakamoto explains: 
If [an] attacker [were] able to assemble more CPU power than all the 
honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud 
people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. 
He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that 
favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to 
undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth. 
Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4.  
 73. Id. at 6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. As many have pointed out, Bitcoin only provides pseudo-anonymity. 
Because users are still identified by their addresses, “sophisticated network 
analysis techniques [could be used by law enforcement] to parse the transaction 
flow and track down individual Bitcoin users.” Adrian Chen, The Underground 
Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, GAWKER (Jun. 1, 2011), 
http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-rug 
-imaginable (quoting core Bitcoin developer, Jeff Garzik). Indeed, “individuals 
sometimes post [their addresses] online in ways that can be connected to their 
online identities.” Grinberg, supra note 8, at 179. See Fergal Reid & Martin 
Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System, CORNELL UNIV. 
LIBRARY (2011), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4524v1.pdf (concluding that by “using 
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Because the Bitcoin system is able to manage all of these 
functions itself, it reduces its users’ reliance on financial 
intermediaries.78 As a result, small value transactions are made 
possible, and the costs of doing business are reduced.79 Furthermore, 
the impossibility of payment reversal, combined with the pseudo-
anonymous nature of Bitcoin payments, allows users to transact with 
any merchant they see fit, regardless of the questionable nature of 
that merchant’s business.80  
In addition to reducing its dependency on financial 
intermediaries, the Bitcoin system also needs no central bank to 
function.81 The initial issuance of the currency is accomplished 
through the process of mining, which rewards the system’s early 
adopters in exchange for their help in securing and supporting the 
network.82 The network also addresses the issue of regulating the 
supply of Bitcoins by setting a cap on the amount of Bitcoins that 
can ever be created at 21 million.83 Because miners are compensated 
for validating blocks, an event calculated to occur roughly once 
                                                                                                             
 
an appropriate network representation, it is possible to map many users to public 
keys” and that “casual users need to be aware of this, especially when sending 
Bitcoins to users and organizations they would prefer not to be publicly associated 
with”). One such precaution a user could take would be to generate a new address 
for each transaction. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 6. 
 78. Fees, however, have not been completely eliminated. Users looking to 
trade the currency on Bitcoin exchanges and buyers seeking to protect themselves 
from fraudulent sellers through the use of escrow services must pay fees to the 
entities operating these businesses. Bitcoin Has Got Geeks Excited. What About 
Economists?, supra note 8; Fees, BTCROW, http://btcrow.com (follow the “Fees” 
hyperlink located at the bottom of the page) (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). See 
discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 79. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1.  
 80. There are other notable benefits to Bitcoin’s reduction of financial 
intermediaries. First, the currency is essentially a digital cash system, a user does 
not need to rely on his credit history to qualify to use it, as is the case with credit 
cards. Bitcoin Has Got Geeks Excited. What About Economists?, supra note 8. 
Second, every Bitcoin transaction, regardless of where it is sent, typically clears 
within ten minutes, as opposed to the days it takes banks to complete international 
transfers. Bitcoin for Business, BITCOIN.ORG, http://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-for-
businesses (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Melvin Richardson, Processing Time of 
Receiving an International Bank Wire Transfer, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com 
/about_5456118_processing-international-bank-wire-transfer.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2013). 
 81. J.P., supra note 46. 
 82. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4. 
 83. J.P., supra note 46. Should the system survive long enough, this plateau in 
the supply of Bitcoins should occur around 2030. Id.  
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every ten minutes, the supply of Bitcoins increases at a steady, 
predictable rate.84 
This aspect of the Bitcoin system should, in theory, keep 
inflation low and place investment and spending decisions on more 
solid ground.85 In fact, as the number of Bitcoins issued begins to 
decline, their value will grow.86 Slow and steady deflation like this 
is normally a destructive force in modern economies, primarily 
because it is unexpected.87 Bitcoin, on the other hand, should not fall 
victim to this problem, because its users will anticipate the effect.88 
II. BITCOIN’S LEGAL STATUS 
When first introduced to Bitcoin, individuals often question its 
legality.89 In other words, they wonder if someone may lawfully 
create a private currency like Bitcoin in the United States. In fact, 
both digital and tangible private currencies are nothing new, the 
latter having existed in this country for over two centuries.90 
Looking at the issue in its entirety requires an analysis of certain 
provisions of the United States Constitution, in addition to an 
obscure currency-related law—the Stamp Payments Act of 1862. An 
ultimate finding of legality should have a positive impact on the 
demand for Bitcoins because legal uncertainty tends to inhibit 
economic growth.91 
A. The Constitution 
The Constitution gives Congress the power “to coin money” and 
“regulate the value thereof”92 while also prohibiting the states from 
                                                                                                             
 84. Interestingly, Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics, argued 
that automated systems to increase the money supply could replace the role of 
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve. Id.; MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 11. 
 85. J.P., supra note 46. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 86. Simonite, supra note 9. Bitcoins “can be divided down to the eighth 
decimal place, which may prove increasingly useful [as] their value grows.” 
Lowenthal, supra note 12. 
 87. Simonite, supra note 9 (quoting Russ Roberts, professor of economics at 
George Mason University). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Jacob Goldstein & David Kestenbaum, What Is Bitcoin?, NPR (Aug. 24, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/08/24/138673630/what-is-bitcoin; 
O’Brien, supra note 53. 
 90. GOOD, supra note 67. More recent examples include the Ithaca Hour and 
BerkShare. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also infra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182; PENG HWA ANG, ORDERING CHAOS: 
REGULATING THE INTERNET 22 (2005). 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
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doing the same.93 The Framers’ definition of “money,” though, was 
limited only to coins.94 While the document also forbids the states 
from issuing paper money,95 it is silent concerning the federal 
government’s ability to do so.96 Thus, the Constitution goes no 
further than establishing Congress’s authority over the money of the 
United States to the exclusion of the states.97 That is, it does not 
prohibit the private issuance of currency inasmuch as it makes no 
mention of the subject altogether.98 
B. The Stamp Payments Act of 1862  
In the latter half of the 19th century, Congress finally addressed 
the issue of private currency.99 Its action stemmed from a concern that 
individuals were hoarding United States coins, because the value of 
their metal surpassed the face value of the coins.100 The resulting 
shortage of coins led the issuance of private bank notes of small 
denomination.101 Congress responded with the Stamp Payments Act 
of 1862, which attempted to combat the problem with criminal 
sanctions.102 Though the Act has been amended multiple times over 
the past 150 years, section two remains substantively the same to this 
day.103 It provides that: 
                                                                                                             
 93. “No state shall . . . coin money . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. “The 
Framers were concerned primarily with restricting the states from influencing 
monetary policy . . . .” LEWIS D. SOLOMON, RETHINKING OUR CENTRALIZED 
MONETARY SYSTEM: THE CASE FOR A SYSTEM OF LOCAL CURRENCIES 95–96 
(1996). 
 94. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 96. 
 95. “No state shall . . . emit bills of credit . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  
 96. Congress’s authority to issue paper money was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court in The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1871). SOLOMON, supra note 93, 
at 96.  
 97. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 95–96; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182. 
 98. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 95–96. Other acts from our nation’s founding 
era (such as the Coinage Act of 1792, which established the United States Mint 
and regulated the nation’s coins) are also silent about private currencies. Id. at 96–
97. 
 99. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 183; SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 97–98. 
 100. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 183 (citing Thomas P. Vartanian et. al, Echoes 
of the Past with Implications for the Future: The Stamp Payments Act of 1862 and 
Electronic Commerce, 67 BANKING REP. (BNA) 464 (1996)). 
 101. Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to 
Electronic Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 671, 693 (1997) (citing 
Thomas P. Vartanian et. al, Echoes of the Past with Implications for the Future: 
The Stamp Payments Act of 1862 and Electronic Commerce, 67 BANKING REP. 
(BNA) 464, 464 (1996)). 
 102. Id. at 693. 
 103. The Act was amended in 1873, 1909, 1948, and 1994. SOLOMON, supra 
note 93, at 98.  
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Whoever makes, issues, circulates, or pays out any note, 
check, memorandum, token, or other obligation for a less 
sum than $1, intended to circulate as money or to be 
received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United 
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than six months, or both.104 
While Congress has paid some attention to the Act in the 
modern era, no published court opinions have interpreted its 
meaning since 1899.105 Early case law, though limited, is able to 
provide at least some insight as to its application. 
In United States v. Van Auken,106 the Supreme Court recognized 
that in passing the Act, Congress primarily intended it “to prevent 
competition with the national currency.”107 Thus, it would not apply 
to anything with a limited circulation.108 This determination in Van 
Auken, and in similar cases, rested on the fact that the notes were 
only redeemable in merchandise and that they did not physically 
resemble the nation’s official currency.109 
Modern, paper-based, private currencies such as the Ithaca Hour 
and BerkShare only circulate within particular communities and are 
only accepted at certain businesses.110 Furthermore, their values are 
                                                                                                             
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006). 
 105. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 190. See United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F. 
977 (D. Minn. 1899). 
 106. United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1877).  
 107. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 97. 
 108. Van Auken, 96 U.S. at 367–68. 
 109. Id. at 367–68 (“Small notes payable in any specific articles, if issued, 
could have only a neighborhood circulation, and but a limited one there.”); United 
States v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 26 F. Cas. 1292, 1292–93 (W.D. Pa. 1863) 
(“[T]hese tickets have no resemblance . . . to the coin of the United States . . . of 
which it was the design of the act to advance and protect. . . . They do not contain 
a promise to pay money, they are not the representatives of money, and therefore 
cannot be said to circulate, or be intended to circulate as money.”); Roussopulous, 
95 F. at 978 (“[T]he metal token . . . differs . . . plainly from all coins of the United 
States, and is not liable to be mistaken for any of them . . . . It does not purport to 
be a piece of money, or an obligation to pay money, and the obligation expressed 
is in terms solvable in merchandise. It cannot, therefore, have been intended to 
circulate as money, or to be received and used in lieu of lawful money, and does 
not come within the prohibition . . . .”); Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188 n.132. 
 110. GOOD, supra note 67; Jane O’Brien, BerkShares Boost the Berkshires in 
Massachusetts, BBC (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-
canada-14814834; SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 98; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182. 
The same can be said for the digital currencies discussed supra, note 8, as they 
may only be used to purchase goods in the virtual worlds of which they are a part. 
Grinberg, supra note 8, at 186. The Ithaca Hour is a local currency that was 
established in 1991 in Ithaca, New York, by a resident and self-described 
“community economist.” The currency is denominated in Hours and notes come in 
various amounts; each Hour is equivalent to $10. Since its creation, approximately 
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tied to the U.S. dollar, and their smallest notes are denominated in 
values greater than one dollar.111 As such, they have been able to 
escape criminal liability under the Act.112 
Bitcoin is not geographically constricted like these currencies. 
Its supporters are pushing for it to be a widely accepted medium of 
exchange on the Internet, an aspect that could lead a court to find 
that Bitcoins, indeed, “circulate as money.”113 Furthermore, Bitcoin 
was designed to be economically superior to government-backed 
currencies, and those who transact in Bitcoins necessarily do so to 
the exclusion of the U.S. dollar.114 In this sense, some may see 
Bitcoin as competing with the nation’s currency.115 Finally, because 
Bitcoin is able to restore the practicality of micropayments, there 
can be little doubt that it will be used to engage in transactions far 
below the Act’s one-dollar threshold.116 
There are many valid counterarguments, however, that Bitcoin 
would fall outside of the Act’s scope. First, because Bitcoins are 
primarily intended for Internet transactions, they do not actually 
compete with the currency of the United States; it may be more 
accurate to say that digital currencies, like Bitcoin, compete with 
online payment processors, such as PayPal and Dwolla, and credit 
cards.117 Second, unlike the previously mentioned community 
currencies, Bitcoin’s value is not pegged to the dollar, but is 
determined by supply and demand.118 As such, an argument can be 
made that Bitcoin transactions, no matter how small, are not “for a 
less sum than $1,” because Bitcoins are not denominated in 
dollars.119 
In evaluating how the Stamp Payments Act could apply to 
digital currencies in general, scholars have suggested that in order 
                                                                                                             
 
$63,000 worth of Hours have been issued. GOOD, supra note 67. The BerkShare is 
another community currency that circulates in the BerkShare region of 
Massachusetts. Created in 2006, it is accepted at over 400 local businesses. The 
currency comes in values of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50; each BerkShare is worth 95% of 
$1; that is, they represent a 5% discount. What Are BerkShares?, BERKSHARES, 
INC., http://www.berkshares.org/whatareberkshares.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 111. GOOD, supra note 67; O’Brien, supra note 110.  
 112. GOOD, supra note 67; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 186 (citing Ellen 
Graham, Community Groups Print Local (and Legal) Currencies, WALL STREET 
J., Jun. 27, 1996, at B1).  
 113. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 187; 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006). 
 114. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 115. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 187. 
 116. Id. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 117. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 187.  
 118. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 119. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 186; 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006). 
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for something to “circulate as money,” it must posses the physical 
characteristics of money.120 This argument is supported in the text of 
the Act, which refers to “any note, check, memorandum, token, or 
other obligation.”121 Each of these items is a “physical manifestation 
of currency.”122 As a digital currency, Bitcoin is completely 
intangible, a fact that could exclude it from the Act’s reach.123  
Perhaps the strongest textual argument is that each of the 
prohibited items in the list above is an obligation, as is indicated by 
the final phrase “or other obligation.”124 Unlike many of the items at 
issue in the cases interpreting the Act, Bitcoins are not obligations 
because no “entity has promised to provide something in return for 
[them].”125 Thus, even if an argument were made that Bitcoins are 
“digital tokens,” they would fall outside the list’s range, as they are 
not obligations.126 
Finally, because the Act was passed to address a shortage of 
United States coins, its legislative purpose has long since 
vanished.127 Although it was stylistically amended as recently as 
1994, Congress did not add “digital currency” or any similar term to 
the list of proscribed items.128 Their failure to do so could certainly 
indicate that they did not intend for the Act to apply to such 
things.129 Furthermore, it is not likely that when the Act was 
                                                                                                             
 120. Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, How Best to Guide the Evolution of 
Electronic Currency Law, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1997); 18 U.S.C. § 336. 
 121. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188; 18 U.S.C. § 336. 
 122. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188. 
 123. Although, “[i]f faced with an ether-based payment system . . . a court may 
dismiss the relevance of distinctions based on physical attributes and instead may 
focus on similarities arising from non-physical properties, such as the rights and 
obligations of the holders.” Smith & Wilson, supra note 120, at 1110.  
 124. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188–89 n.132; 18 U.S.C. § 336.  
 125. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 189. See United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 
366, 367 (1877) (item was an obligation from The Bangor Furnace Company that 
could be redeemed for 50¢ in goods at their store); United States v. Monongahela 
Bridge Co., 26 F.Cas. 1292, 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1863) (item was a paper ticket for one 
trip across the Monongahela Bridge); United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F. 977, 
978 (D. Minn. 1899) (item was a metal token from Clark & Boice Lumber 
Company that could be redeemed for 50¢ in merchandise). 
 126. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 189. 
 127. Wilson, supra note 101, at 693. 
 128. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Digital Currency 28–29 (Yale 
Law School, Working Paper, 2011) (on file with author) (later published as 
Grinberg, supra note 8). 
 129. Id. at 29. Their inaction could also “be taken as a sign that Congress 
intended to breathe new life into the Act, reaffirming and extending its prohibition 
to all twentieth century obligations—including electronic ones.” Kerry Lynn 
Macintosh, The New Money, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659, 672 n.78 (1999). Even 
if this were the case, Bitcoins would still side-step proscription, as they are not 
obligations. 
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originally written, lawmakers could have intended for it to 
encompass digital currencies, a machination of technology that 
would not be conceived for over 100 more years.130 
In lieu of the continuing expansion in the number of digital 
currencies, the Treasury Department has requested that the Act be 
interpreted narrowly by the Department of Justice; some scholars have 
even called for its repeal.131 Regardless of the Act’s continued 
existence, Bitcoin is unlikely to be challenged by it, as the arguments 
for bringing Bitcoin within its purview are overwhelmingly outweighed 
by the arguments against doing so. Indeed, digital currencies have been 
around in some form or another for over a decade and neither their 
creators nor their users have yet to be prosecuted under the Act—nor 
should they be worried about this possibility.132As such, the remainder 
of this Comment surveys the activities occurring within the Bitcoin 
economy, with a focus on how regulators should respond to its more 
“concerning” aspects. 
III. THE BITCOIN ECONOMY 
A. Market Participants 
In Bitcoin’s short lifespan, it has amassed a base of approximately 
10,000 users, including several hundred merchants that currently 
accept the digital currency as a method of payment.133 However, the 
currency has yet to find adoption with any mainstream retailers, 
such as Amazon.com.134 Despite the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of these merchants are small businesses that operate in the 
technology sector,135 the goods and services provided by the 
remainder are incredibly diverse.136 Indeed, they run the gamut from 
sellers of clothing, home, and car accessories, to brick-and-mortar 
establishments, like restaurants, hotels, and travel companies.137 
                                                                                                             
 130. Macintosh, supra note 129, at 672. 
 131. Wilson, supra note 101, at 693; Macintosh, supra note 129, at 672 n.78. 
 132. Smith & Wilson, supra note 120, at 1111. 
 133. J.P., supra note 46. 
 134. Daniel Roberts, The Clock Is Ticking on Bitcoin, CNN MONEY (Jun. 17, 
2011), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/17/the-clock-is-ticking-on-bitcoin. 
 135. Id. For example, these businesses include providers of Internet services 
such as website design and development, virtual private and dedicated servers, 
domain names, VoIP, and security, in addition to software, online auctions, 
technical consulting, and a number of other digital products. Trade, BITCOIN WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Trade (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (listing online and real 
world businesses that currently accept Bitcoin).  
 136. Trade, supra note 135. 
 137. Goldstein & Kestenbaum, supra note 89; Trade, supra note 135. New 
York’s Meze Grill, located in midtown Manhattan, has garnered significant 
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Three attorneys located in the United States have even offered to 
provide legal services in exchange for Bitcoins.138 Furthermore, a 
handful of organizations (including a few nonprofits) accept 
donations in Bitcoins; among these is the notorious whistle-blowing 
website, Wikileaks, and the hacker group Lulz Security.139 
Businesses in the financial sector also make up an important part 
of the Bitcoin economy. While they range from providers of escrow 
and online wallet services, to mobile payment systems, perhaps the 
most crucial of these are Bitcoin exchanges.140 By matching buyers 
with sellers, these businesses facilitate the conversion of Bitcoins to 
(and from) at least two dozen established fiat currencies, such as the 
dollar, euro, and pound sterling.141 For individuals looking to 
                                                                                                             
 
attention in the news media for accepting Bitcoins. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 
134. 
 138. Trade, supra note 135. 
 139. Donation Accepting Organizations and Projects, BITCOIN WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Donation-accepting_organizations_and_projects (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2011) (listing notable organizations that accept Bitcoin donations); 
Eria Ogg, Hackers Steal More Customer Info From Sony’s Servers, CNET NEWS 
(Jun. 2, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31021_3-20068414-260/hackers-steal-
more-customer-info-from-sony-servers. Near the beginning of 2011, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation began accepting Bitcoin donations but abandoned 
the practice six months later as a result of the “untested legal concerns” Bitcoin 
creates. Rainey Reitman, Bitcoin: A Step Toward Censorship-Resistant Digital 
Currency, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www 
.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/bitcoin-step-toward-censorship-resistant; Cohn, supra 
note 18. Nakamoto was undoubtedly very concerned about the negative attention 
Bitcoin was receiving after Wikileaks began accepting the digital currency to 
support its activities. Before essentially disappearing from the Internet, one of his 
final public posts contained the message: “WikiLeaks has kicked the hornet’s nest, 
and the swarm is headed towards us.” Satoshi Nakamoto, Re:PC World Article on 
Bitcoin, BITCOIN FORUM (Dec. 11, 2010, 11:39 PM), https://bitcointalk.org/index 
.php?topic=2216.msg29280#msg29280; Joe Duncko, Who Created Bitcoins?, 
WRITTEN BY JOE DUNCKO (Jun. 20, 2011), http://joeduncko.com/2011/06/20 
/who-created-bitcoins. 
 140. Trade, supra note 135. As opposed to the Bitcoin client, which stores the 
user’s currency only on their computer, online wallet services store Bitcoins in a 
centralized location so that any web-connected device can have access to them. In 
a way, they may be thought of as Bitcoin banks, although they do not perform any 
traditional banking services. FAQ, FLEXCOIN, http://www.flexcoin.com/15.html 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011); J.P., supra note 46.  
 141. Bitcoin’s Network of Exchanges Expands, BITCOIN MONEY (Sept. 6, 
2011), http://www.bitcoinmoney.com/post/9872899440/global-exchange-trading-
expands. These exchanges also allow traders to engage in arbitrage opportunities. 
Vitalik Buterin, BTC Trader: Bitcoin Arbitrage Made Easy, BITCOIN MAGAZINE 
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/btc-trader-bitcoin-arbitrage-made-
easy. Bitcoin Arbitrage Opportunities, NYSE-GROUP.DE, http://nyse-group.de 
/bitcoin-arbitrage (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
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transact in Bitcoins without having to mine for them, these 
exchanges provide the simplest method of obtaining the digital 
currency and also the easiest way to convert Bitcoins back to other 
fiat currencies.142 The number of operating exchanges continues to 
expand and the volume of transactions that pass through them is 
fairly substantial.143 For example, Mt. Gox, one of the more popular 
exchanges, has moved $70 million in funds in the last six months 
alone.144 
As far as individual users go, those holding Bitcoins do so for a 
number of different reasons. Categorically, they vary from privacy, 
technology, and cryptography enthusiasts to speculators and 
government-mistrusting individuals who would rather hold their 
assets in a vehicle other than state-controlled fiat money.145 One 
group of Bitcoin users, however, has received significantly more 
attention by the media than others—criminals.146  
Due to the partial anonymity that the Bitcoin system provides,147 
many have raised the issue of its ability to facilitate a multitude of 
illegal activities, including money laundering, tax evasion, the sale 
of stolen credit cards, and the funding of online gambling (in 
jurisdictions where it is prohibited).148 For the most part, the amount 
of criminal activity occurring with digital currencies is, at this point, 
mere conjecture and undoubtedly subject to the hyperbolic 
tendencies of the press.149 The use of Bitcoins to purchase illegal 
drugs through the Internet, however, is very real.150 
The Silk Road Marketplace is a website that allow its users to 
buy and sell anything, from marijuana and heroin to LSD and 
ecstasy.151 This online black market operates on the anonymizing 
                                                                                                             
 142. J.P., supra note 46. 
 143. Bitcoin’s Network of Exchanges Expands, supra note 141. 
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 145. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 165. 
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network, Tor,152 which allows the site to obfuscate both its location 
and the identity of its administrators.153 Set up in much the same 
way as traditional e-commerce websites, visitors peruse the 
hundreds of items listed for sale, in addition to reviews that have 
been written about their sellers by previous buyers.154 After adding 
items to their shopping carts, buyers are required to pay with the 
only currency the website accepts: Bitcoins.155 Possibly, the most 
alarming aspect of Silk Road is that a significant amount of the 
market’s sellers are located in the United States and Canada.156 
In June of 2011, Senators Charles Schumer of New York and 
Joe Manchin of West Virginia sent a letter to United States Attorney 
General Eric Holder and Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator 
Michele Leonhart. They urged the officials to immediately shut 
down Silk Road.157 In the letter, the Senators referenced the 
“untraceable peer-to-peer currency known as Bitcoins” as the sole 
method of payment accepted by the website.158 While their 
description of the digital currency as “untraceable” is somewhat 
exaggerated,159 it has only increased the unfavorable attention that 
Bitcoin has received.160 
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B. Likelihood of Success  
Excepting any challenges to Bitcoin’s legality,161 however 
unlikely, there are a number of hurdles that the Bitcoin economy 
must overcome if the currency that drives it is to remain useful. The 
first of these hurdles involves economic stability. 
In the Bitcoin economy, price volatility is still a huge problem. 
Both in the short and long term, the currency has been prone to 
significant value fluctuations, arguably the result of ideological 
enthusiasm and widespread speculation.162 Such fluctuations make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for merchants to accurately price their 
products in Bitcoins.163 This, in turn, has a negative effect on the 
number of businesses that are willing to accept the currency as a 
method of payment.164 Indeed, the Bitcoin system’s continued 
existence heavily depends on its ability to attract the critical mass of 
merchants and consumers necessary to make dealing in the currency 
practical.165  
Bitcoin’s incredible upward leaps in value, at times, have led to 
the fear that it is being used primarily to speculate; that is, 
individuals have been buying Bitcoins only as an investment 
vehicle.166 The digital currency’s approach to capping its money 
supply exacerbates this problem: the fact that Bitcoins are likely to 
be worth more in the future incentivizes hoarding, thereby 
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preventing their use as a medium of exchange.167 Furthermore, 
because Bitcoin is not the legal tender of any country, there is no 
reason that its users would need to start spending them.168 
Another hurdle is security. In the past few months, incidents 
have occurred in the Bitcoin economy that have decreased 
confidence in the currency. Two incidents resulted in the theft of 
Bitcoins,169 while another led to a massive sell-off and subsequent 
price crash of the digital currency.170 While all were allegedly the 
result of security breaches, a failure of the Bitcoin software itself 
was not directly responsible; improvements to the software, 
however, could have at least reduced the damage of one of the 
incidents.171 Thus, Bitcoin’s expansion also depends on its 
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unknown hacker gaining access to the computer of a Bitcoin user and stealing his 
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trading value at the incident. Cohen, supra note 26. 
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community’s ability to increase protective measures and ease its 
users’ minds. 
What is left to be seen is whether Bitcoin’s provision of lower 
fees and pseudo-anonymous transactions will be valuable to the 
average consumer.172 The digital currency does not need to become 
mainstream in order to be successful; it could find plenty of use in 
niche markets, such as those that cater to technologists, providers of 
digital goods, and participants in virtual worlds.173 It could also 
explode in popularity with those planning to use it for nefarious 
purposes.174 At this point, then, its fate ultimately rests in the 
direction taken by those behind the wheel. For a decentralized 
currency like Bitcoin, that means its users.175   
IV. ROADS TO REGULATION 
Senators Schumer and Manchin’s letter to officials in the 
Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Agency has done 
nothing but draw speculation that in the future, Bitcoin will in fact 
be subjected to government regulation or, more drastically, 
prohibition.176 Even though Bitcoin is not the first digital currency 
to be the target of government action,177 many of the challenges it 
presents are wholly new. Its distributed nature and lack of corporate 
backing means that there is no central database to shut down and no 
company officers to hold accountable.178 Because a community of 
open source developers maintains its code, if some developers were 
to leave the project, through choice or coercion, others would likely 
take up the reigns. The issues, however, go much deeper than this.  
As many in the Bitcoin community are quick to remind those 
participating in discussions on this topic, the United States does not 
exercise preeminent control over the medium through which 
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Bitcoins travel: the Internet itself.179 Because the latter is able to cut 
through invisible geographic boundaries, it erodes the traditional 
jurisdictional notions upon which laws and their enforcement are 
founded.180 As such, in dealing with an inherently elaborate and 
distributed system like Bitcoin, there may be no way to exercise 
perfect control over it. This does not mean, however, that effective 
control is out of the question. Even partial control over the Bitcoin 
system could have considerable effects.181 
The goal of this Part is to provide insight as to what sort of 
regulatory regime would be most effective at addressing the 
concerns presented by the Bitcoin system, while also taking into 
account the community response they would elicit.182 Three regimes 
are evaluated: self-regulation (representing the current state of the 
Bitcoin system), intermediary regulation, and prohibition. Each 
regime represents a distinct position on a regulatory scale with 
respect to the level that it would constrain the use of Bitcoins, and 
each entails a different set of benefits and costs. 
A. Self-Regulation 
For regulating the Internet, many believe that self-regulation is 
the most desirable solution.183 That is to say, social norms184 and 
market mechanisms should govern the relationships between users 
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without the need for state intervention.185 In practice, self-regulation 
via norms was sufficient during the Internet’s early days when the 
medium was primarily used as a research tool for government 
agencies and academic institutions.186 Since then, however, the 
Internet’s landscape has transformed into one dominated by 
commerce.187 In this new era, some feel that government involvement 
is required to enforce the rights of transacting parties.188 
The Bitcoin system exemplifies the Internet’s commercial 
evolution; indeed, the system is premised on the idea that software 
can be designed to address the shortcomings of the market.189 
However, Bitcoin’s architectural constraints have, in fact, created 
their own problems. In turn, market mechanisms have developed to 
provide a solution without state intervention. 
More specifically, Bitcoin transactions are practically 
irreversible.190 Considering the amount of computing power that 
secures them, they are essentially etched in stone. While such 
architectural constraints are a boon to honest merchants, inasmuch 
as they are protected from the practices of fraudulent buyers, Bitcoin 
has no architectural constraints which protect honest buyers from 
fraudulent merchants. To provide these consumers with such 
protection, reputation systems and escrow services have naturally 
developed as a self-regulatory response.191 
Reputation systems are an instrument through which legitimate 
business practices are enforced. If a merchant defrauds a buyer, then 
the buyer can complain about him in a public forum.192 Thus, the 
community can punish the merchant by warning others of his 
malfeasance and encouraging them to refuse to patronize his 
business.193 As a result, merchants are incentivized to protect their 
“reputational capital.”194 One such example of this system in 
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practice is the Bitcoin Police, a community-run organization whose 
function is to identify and prevent scammers in the Bitcoin 
economy.195 
This mechanism, though, has shortcomings. To be effective, it 
requires a small community where information is simple to collect 
and disseminate.196 As the Bitcoin economy grows, complete 
information becomes harder to obtain and the chance of market 
failure increases. Furthermore, reputation systems may only protect 
consumers in an aggregate sense. As one of the recent fiascos in the 
Bitcoin economy has illustrated, a single incident of fraud can have 
particularly catastrophic results.197 This problem is exacerbated 
because fraudsters may be able to obfuscate their identities using 
Bitcoin.198 
Self-regulation could also be capable of preventing large-scale 
criminal activities if more Bitcoin exchanges were to employ 
“autonomous agents.” Autonomous agents are software programs 
able to scan large amounts of financial transactions for irregularities; 
potentially, they can even halt a transaction from being processed.199 
As such, these agents represent a code-based approach to prevent 
the laundering of funds through Bitcoin exchanges. The incentive 
for these exchanges in developing and implementing autonomous 
agents is that it increases the legitimacy and trustworthiness of their 
business; effective laundering-prevention policies ensure that 
government authorities are less likely to shut them down and may 
even lead to increased business.200 At least one Bitcoin exchange, 
CampBX, has already done this.201 In fact, due to the time and 
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money they have invested in developing this program, they consider 
it a competitive advantage.202 
The use of these agents by a single Bitcoin exchange is not 
representative of the entire industry; more exchanges (in an effort to 
be seen as a legitimate) would have to follow in CampBX’s 
footsteps. Furthermore, this mechanism also suffers from a lack of 
transparency; cooperation between Bitcoin exchanges in setting 
standards for how these invisible, code-based regulators operate 
would ensure that no single exchange has an exploitable loophole. 
In the Bitcoin economy, self-regulation falls short in its inability 
to stop small-scale criminal activities. In tinier online communities, 
where the group’s interests are cohesive, social norms can govern 
effectively, as long as the group has some kind of mechanism in 
place to enforce desired behaviors.203 The Bitcoin community, 
however, does not. While many within it criticize those who use the 
currency to commit crimes, others embrace the libertarian ideals that 
the currency represents and have no problem using it for such 
purposes.204 Bitcoin is much more than a growing community: it is a 
growing economy, representing a diverse collection of interests.205 
And because the Bitcoin software provides no way to punish its 
users or to stop them from using it criminally, state action will be 
necessary to prevent such uses. 
An evaluation of self-regulation in the Bitcoin economy shows 
that some mechanisms have developed to ensure that consumers are 
adequately protected. Furthermore, an increase in the use of 
autonomous agents by Bitcoin exchanges would help to reduce the 
occurrence of large-scale criminal activities. Admittedly, neither of 
these mechanisms is perfect, but they illustrate a drive by at least 
some members of the community to ensure that the economy is seen 
as legitimate. Where self-regulation fails outright, however, is with 
respect to small-scale criminal activities. The community itself 
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possesses no discernable means to punish wrongdoers, and it is 
likely that state action is required. 
B. Regulation of Market Participants 
Currently, the vast majority of activity in the Bitcoin economy 
involves the movement of funds by investors, speculators, and 
traders through Bitcoin exchanges.206 By facilitating the conversion 
of Bitcoins to and from more established (and stable) currencies, 
they are indispensable entities to the functioning of the Bitcoin 
economy. That is, they could best be described as valves through 
which the illicit earnings of any major criminal enterprise must flow. 
Thus, these exchanges represent a logical place to begin 
implementing mechanisms designed to prevent large-scale criminal 
activities from taking place using the currency. 
In fact, these exchanges may already fall into an existing 
regulatory scheme—one that governs the operation of certain 
financial institutions known as “money service businesses.” These 
businesses cash checks, deal in foreign exchange, and provide 
prepaid access or money transmission services.207 Bitcoin exchanges 
would probably be categorized as the latter. Money transmitters 
accept “currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency” 
and transmit it “to another location or person by any means.”208 
Additionally, an entity may be classified as a money transmitter 
based on the specific facts and circumstances that surround the 
operation of its business.209 
The definition of money transmitter was revised in 2011. The 
previous version was more limited, which led to some ambiguity as 
to where digital currency exchanges would fit into these 
regulations.210 For example, an exchange might have raised the 
defense that private currencies do not actually qualify as “funds.”211 
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Regardless of the merits of such an argument, the inclusion of 
“value that substitutes for currency” is sure to foreclose any doubt 
whether Bitcoin exchanges are covered under the revised 
regulations.212 
Under these regulations (and the federal statutes they cross-
reference), if Bitcoin exchanges were indeed categorized as money 
transmitters, they would have to comply with a number of rules 
governing their operation.213 First, operators of these businesses are 
required to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(also known as FinCEN, a division of the Department of the 
Treasury).214 They must also compile “certain reports or records 
[that] have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory 
investigations”215 in addition to developing and implementing 
effective anti-money-laundering programs.216 Finally, under the 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, these financial institutions 
would also be required to verify and maintain records on the 
identities of their customers.217 
There are two major advantages to ensuring that Bitcoin 
exchanges comply with these regulations. The first is that the rules 
are preexisting; in other words, no additional legislative effort is 
required to devise a wholly new, Bitcoin-specific framework to 
govern the operation of these entities. Second, the reporting 
standards the regulations call for were precisely designed to inhibit 
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exchanges would have been exempted under this provision. However, the 
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1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) (2011). 
 213. Tucker, supra note 21, at 611–12; see also 31 C.F.R. § 1022.200 (2012). 
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criminals from funneling their proceeds through these types of 
nonbank financial institutions. As such, the regulations would need no 
further alteration to achieve their purpose in the context of the Bitcoin 
economy. Thus, a definitive administrative ruling by the Treasury 
Department—clarifying the application of these requirements to 
Bitcoin exchanges and stating their intent to enforce compliance—
may be all that is additionally necessary.218  
The drawback to relying on these regulations, however, comes 
in the form of the limited jurisdiction of the United States. That is, 
measures such as this will only be effective if they are enforced on 
an international scale by cooperating nations.219 Many exchanges 
are located abroad and would probably prefer not to undertake the 
substantial costs associated with registration and compliance.220 
Criminal enterprises, then, could utilize these noncompliant 
exchanges to increase the chance that their activities would escape 
governmental scrutiny. 
In sum, the regulations governing the operation of money 
service businesses provide an existing framework for stymieing 
large-scale criminal activities in the Bitcoin economy. However, 
without enforcement abroad, they may only prove to be effective at 
the domestic level. Furthermore, casual transactions for contraband 
items would likely continue to go unnoticed. 
C. Prohibition 
A prohibition on the use of Bitcoins would not be unheard of. 
Lawmakers have, in fact, banned the use of certain technologies in the 
past. For example, provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act criminalize the dissemination of any technology whose primary 
purpose is to circumvent digital copyright protections.221 Prohibitive 
measures, however, are typically not taken unless the technology’s 
harms greatly outweigh the societal benefits from its use.222 In such 
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circumstances, lawmakers tend to view prohibition as the most 
efficient solution.223 
In Sony v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court was faced 
with deciding whether Sony, producer of the Betamax home video 
recorder, could be held liable for contributing to the copyright 
infringing activities of its customers.224 In resolving the case in favor 
of Sony, the Court determined that the Betamax was “capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses” and, additionally, that there was no 
evidence that Sony encouraged infringing behavior.225 
Admittedly, Bitcoin has nothing to do with copyright 
infringement. Sony, however, provides a useful analogy of how 
regulators might view the Bitcoin system: prohibitive measures will 
not likely be taken against the digital currency unless lawmakers 
find that it is being used almost exclusively for illicit purposes.226 In 
other words, if average consumers were unimpressed by Bitcoin’s 
advantages and its economy was devoid of any lawful activity, a 
prohibition might make sense. 
A ban on Bitcoin’s use could also result if it was able to 
sufficiently challenge the U.S. dollar.227 Some scholars have 
suggested that lawmakers might respond with hostility to successful 
digital currencies because they could eventually undermine the 
government’s seignorage income228 and decrease the value of the 
nation’s currency (if individuals preferred the digital currency to the 
national one).229 
While many, if not all, of these reasons supporting prohibitive 
measures are valid, they are not valid yet. At this point, there are still 
too many legitimate actors in the Bitcoin economy to conclude, as 
Senator Schumer has, that Bitcoin is nothing other than “an online 
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form of money laundering.”230 Furthermore, the Bitcoin economy is 
still too small to warrant concern that it could lead to overall 
economic instability. As governmental financial authorities have 
pointed out, “even if every person in the United States held $150 in 
electronic currency, the total value would amount to less than $50 
billion, which is insignificant relative to the current M1 monetary 
aggregate of $1 trillion.”231 
Prohibitions also tend to be “economically inefficient means of 
regulation” for three primary reasons.232 First, they eliminate any 
potential benefit conferred by the banned technology.233 Second, 
they tend to stymie any future innovation that could have resulted 
from the technology’s continued use.234 Finally, they entail high 
costs with respect to enforcement.235 
These arguments against prohibition also resonate strongly with 
Bitcoin. A proscription on the digital currency’s use would 
concomitantly eliminate the financial advantages and convenience it 
provides to consumers and merchants. Passing a law banning the use 
of the digital currency would also foreclose the future advances it 
could bring as it continues to upend the traditional paradigm of 
Internet commerce.236 Indeed, its novel approach to transaction 
verification has led to the development of other innovative projects, 
which would not have been possible in Bitcoin’s absence.237 
The effects of such a law would do little more than stop the 
majority of law-abiding individuals from using the digital currency 
out of the fear of prosecution, while “Bitcoin criminals” would not 
likely be deterred because they were already engaging in illegal 
activities. Fundamentally, this is the same problem that has troubled 
the entertainment industry for nearly a decade.238 Despite the 
panoply of (expensive) lawsuits that the industry has filed in an 
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attempt to combat peer-to-peer file sharing, illegal downloading has 
only become more popular.239 This analogy may be exceptionally 
appropriate because the architecture behind the Bitcoin system is not 
all that different from that which powers the BitTorrent file-sharing 
software.240 While regulators could attempt to halt the flow of 
Bitcoins by requiring Internet Service Providers to block the digital 
currency’s transactions, sophisticated Bitcoin users could easily 
respond by recalibrating the Bitcoin software to evade this 
technological roadblock.241 
Considering these factors, prohibiting Bitcoin in the near future 
would be a rash and unnecessary response to issues that have not yet 
fully materialized. While the approach may ultimately protect 
consumers by removing them from the system altogether, it would 
probably not affect the behavior of individuals persistent in using 
the digital currency for both small and large-scale criminal activities.  
CONCLUSION 
In theory, the ideas that prompted the development of the 
Bitcoin system are sound. It is the first digital currency to solve the 
double-spending problem without having to introduce a third party. 
This reduces transaction costs for both consumers and merchants 
and protects Bitcoin users from having to share their transactional 
history with financial institutions. Furthermore, Bitcoin’s self-
administered money supply eliminates the need for a central 
authority, which could protect it from both inflation and political 
influence.242  
While the system certainly presents opportunities for criminal 
abuse that cannot be ignored,243 the digital currency is still too much 
in its infancy to have proven that its economic model is sustainable 
and, thus, that its facilitation of illicit activities is likely to 
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continue.244 Moreover, the Bitcoin system has provided a novel 
method of value exchange that could potentially serve as the 
foundation of further innovations. Any regulatory response, then, 
should initially be limited and carefully measured.  
Prohibition is not the answer. Owing to Bitcoin’s distributed 
nature, even if prohibition eventually proves to be a logical choice, it 
would likely never come close to addressing the problems for which 
it was enacted.245 More importantly though, hand-to-hand cash 
transactions are used just as frequently for criminal purposes, yet the 
efforts of lawmakers and law enforcement agencies are directed at 
the criminals themselves and not at the medium through which they 
transact. Indeed, Bitcoin’s blockchain provides a record of all 
transactions that take place on the network.246 Through the use of 
“sophisticated network analysis techniques,”247 law enforcement 
agencies may be able to leverage this public ledger to ferret out any 
small-scale criminal actors using the digital currency for nefarious 
purposes. 
In terms of large-scale criminal activities, government efforts 
should be directed at the exchanges that operate in the Bitcoin 
economy. The recent revision to the regulatory definitions and 
requirements of money service businesses seems to eliminate any 
doubt as to whether Bitcoin exchanges fall within the scope of these 
provisions. In fact, the requirements were designed to combat the 
same large-scale criminal activities that have been identified as a 
major concern in the Bitcoin economy. While ensuring that these 
exchanges comply with the existing statutory scheme may only 
achieve the desired result on a domestic level, until the direction of 
the Bitcoin economy is more fully realized, it represents the best 
solution going forward.248 
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